Inter-office memo

To
Everyone who has published an app with Lovable
From
Mo, Chief Executive
Date
November 14, 2026, 6:14 PM CST
Re
Open databases in Lovable apps

Lovable apps exposed passport numbers and private messages. How to check yours

On November 2, 2026, Crissy Field reported that many Lovable apps let anyone read their databases without a login, exposing passport numbers and over 200,000 chat messages. Lovable puts it down to too-open row-level security, which its free scans flag but don’t block by default. Run a Deep scan in More → Security, fix its findings, and turn on Block publishing with critical issues.

What Crissy Field found

Crissy Field, an application-security firm in Hamburg, published its findings with the German business daily Handelsblatt on November 2, 2026. On November 14 the report reached the front page of Hacker News, where Lovable’s Head of Security answered it.

The researchers found 159,041 Lovable projects in the Common Crawl web archive, made between December 2025 and September 2026, and looked at the 34,545 that used Supabase, the database service they believe most Lovable apps use:

  • 24,664 sent database records as soon as a page loaded, with no login. That alone “is not a security issue,” the report says: “the data may be intended for public display.”
  • 7,403 of those, 30%, gave out records containing email addresses, in 10,560 tables, when the researchers made further read-only requests with the same key. The report warns that the figure “should therefore not be read as a confirmed data leak rate,” since some addresses may be public contacts or test data.

The report does list serious cases. A German lifestyle forum exposed more than 80,000 profiles, with names, email addresses and dates of birth, and more than 200,000 chat messages. Event organizers and restaurants exposed tens of thousands of ticket and food orders, with phone numbers, postal addresses, payment information and ticket codes. One service provider exposed more than 1,000 records of passport numbers, expiration dates and nationalities. In another case, 280,000 emails sent to a provider’s customers could be read.

On Hacker News, the report’s author added that a model they ran on each dataset found “nearly 4,000 websites” leaking privacy-sensitive data, at an 85% confidence threshold. They say they downloaded no more than the first page of any table, deleted what they fetched, and shared the list of sites with Lovable. As for misuse, the report says: “We could not establish whether any of it had been misused.”

Why this wasn’t a hack

A Lovable app’s pages read its database with a key that ships in the page. Lovable’s docs say “Anyone using your app can see the publishable key, and that is intended, because the key gives no privileged access,” and “Your RLS policies protect your data, not the secrecy of the address.”

Those policies are row-level security (RLS), the rules that decide which rows each visitor can read or change. When a table has none, or one that lets everyone through, the public key reads all of it. Supabase’s Security Advisor describes a public table without RLS this way: “Anyone with your project URL can read, edit, and delete all data in this table.” The report’s author put it on Hacker News: “no advanced hacking techniques were used.”

A policy can be on and still too open. Lovable’s docs warn: “If a policy checks only for authenticated, every signed-in user gets the same access to every row that policy covers.” If anyone can sign up, anyone can read those rows.

The report covers apps on a connected Supabase project. Lovable’s own built-in backend, Cloud, is “still less widely used,” and of it the researchers say “Similar misconfigurations may occur there too, but we did not examine them.”

What Lovable says

Igor, Lovable’s Head of Security, answered on Hacker News that the root cause was insufficient row-level security, “which is exactly what our scanning is built to catch. We scan every app automatically before publish and offer a deeper SAST scan, both free for all users.” Pressed on why so many owners leave findings unfixed, Igor replied: “Surprisingly, for many users it’s the fear that the fix will break production.” Lovable aims to turn auto-fix on by default “one day (soon!),” Igor added, without a date.

Lovable had set out its position in a November 10 post: “The most common issue we see in Lovable apps is data access rules that are too open.” Under “What we still need you to do,” it asks owners to review findings “and take action, or let auto-fix do it for you.” It promises, this month, a redesigned security experience and “Scheduled scans on all paid plans.” Its docs today offer scheduled scans on Enterprise only, at one credit a project each run.

According to Cybernews, Lovable told Handelsblatt that this is a known, industry-wide configuration problem around the use of Supabase. Others have found it well beyond Lovable: UpGuard queried about 300,000 domains showing signs of Supabase and found 16,326 databases with readable tables, over half with signs of personal data.

Responsibility sits with you either way. Lovable’s terms say “You are responsible for your Customer Data and for the applications and projects you build, deploy, and make available using the Services,” and its security overview says the same of your app’s security. When a similar finding was filed as CVE-2025-48757 in May 2025, with a severity of 9.3 out of 10, Lovable disputed it “because each individual customer of the Lovable platform accepts a responsibility over protecting the data of their application.”

What Lovable checks, and what’s off until you turn it on

From Lovable’s docs on security scans, publishing and workspace settings, as of November 14:

Safeguard When it runs By default Cost
Quick scan: RLS, open access rules, dependencies Every publish On, but findings “do not block publishing” Free
Deep scan: access control, open endpoints, secrets, payments, sign-in When you start it Off Free; usually 3 to 13 minutes
Review security findings dialog When you publish with critical findings Built-in backend only Free
Block publishing with critical issues Every publish Off, except new Enterprise workspaces Lovable creates Free, on every plan
Auto-fix security issues With each build request in chat Off in each project Uses credits; skips Deep scan findings
Scheduled Deep scans On a schedule Enterprise only One credit a project each run

How to check and lock your app

  1. Run a Deep scan. In the project toolbar, open More → Security and run the Deep security scan. It includes the quick checks. For each critical finding, select Fix. Some findings are deliberate, Lovable says, “like showing usernames publicly on a forum.”
  2. Ask Lovable who can reach your data. Its docs suggest the prompt “Which of my tables can people who aren’t signed in read or change?” On the built-in backend, the rules themselves are under More → Database → Manage → Policies.
  3. On your own Supabase project, check Supabase too. Lovable’s Supabase guide says “Missing RLS policies are the most common way app data gets exposed,” and asks you to “verify them yourself in the Supabase dashboard.” Open its Security Advisor and look for the errors “Table publicly accessible” and “Sensitive data publicly accessible,” and the warning “Security policy allows unrestricted access,” which flags a rule like USING (true). The same checks run from Supabase’s CLI as supabase db advisors, or its MCP server’s get_advisors tool, so a coding agent such as Claude Code or Codex can run them for you. Enjoy runs both on the plans you already have.
  4. Turn on the guards. A workspace admin or owner can switch on Block publishing with critical issues under Workspace settings → Security → Privacy & security → Publishing. Anyone who can edit a project can turn on Project settings → Auto-fix security issues.
  5. Test it as another user. When a scan finds nothing, Lovable’s docs say, “the scanner cannot catch every possible risk,” and passing the publishing block “does not prove that your app is secure.” Sign up as a second user and make sure you can’t see the first one’s data.

Supabase’s October 30 change doesn’t cover old tables

Supabase has changed the default that made this easy. Under a change announced in April, new tables in the public schema aren’t reachable from its Data API, the layer supabase-js calls from an app’s pages, until someone grants access. It began rolling out as the default for new projects on May 30, and was scheduled for every existing project on October 30, 2026. Supabase gave its reason: “agents, CLI scripts, and AI platforms create tables too, and many of those operations do not have a human reviewing the diff.”

It doesn’t close a table that’s already open: “Existing tables are not affected in your project, they keep their current grants and stay reachable.” And “RLS behavior remains unchanged.” A table that was open before the change stays open until you fix its rules, so the steps above still apply.

If your app’s data was open

Fix the rules first. A new key wouldn’t help: it ships in your pages like the old one, and Lovable’s docs say the key “works from anywhere, not only from your app.”

Then think about who you owe notice to. The report’s author said on Hacker News that the findings have “not been reported to the authorities,” and Lovable’s terms make each app’s owner responsible for its data. Where the GDPR applies, Article 33 says the controller “shall without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it” notify the supervisory authority of a personal data breach, “unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk,” and Article 34 requires telling the people affected when the risk is high. Ask a lawyer how that applies to your app.

If you only signed up for an app, you can’t tell from outside whether it was one of them. The report names no apps, and its author says Lovable’s security team would “contact the affected customers,” meaning the apps’ owners. Crissy Field warns that data like this “could be used for phishing, ticket fraud, or identity theft,” so treat a message that quotes your order or ticket with care.

What hasn’t been said

  • How many owners Lovable has reached, or whether its scans flag every app on Crissy Field’s list.
  • When auto-fix or the publishing block becomes the default. Lovable’s Head of Security says “soon” for auto-fix; neither has a date.
  • Whether apps on Lovable Cloud have the same problem. Crissy Field didn’t look.
  • Whether anyone else collected the data while the tables were open.

We’ll update this memo when Lovable or Crissy Field says more.

9.Questions.

Is my Lovable app leaking data?

It is if a table holds private data and its row-level security lets anyone through, or isn’t on. Open More → Security in your project and run the free Deep scan; if you connected your own Supabase project, also check its Security Advisor for “Table publicly accessible” and “Sensitive data publicly accessible.”

Was Lovable hacked?

No. Crissy Field used read-only requests with the key every Lovable app gives the browser, which Lovable says is public “and that is intended.” What protects the data is each app’s row-level security, and in the apps it found, that was missing or let everyone through.

Doesn’t Lovable’s security scan catch this?

It checks for it on every publish, free, and Lovable’s Head of Security says insufficient row-level security is “exactly what our scanning is built to catch.” But findings “do not block publishing by default.” A workspace admin can turn on Block publishing with critical issues, on every plan.

Did Supabase’s October 30 change fix it?

Not for tables that already existed. Supabase stopped exposing new tables to its Data API automatically, and says “Existing tables are not affected in your project, they keep their current grants and stay reachable.” Row-level security is still what protects them.

I signed up on an app built with Lovable. Is my data exposed?

You can’t tell from outside, and Crissy Field hasn’t named the apps. Its report’s author says Lovable’s security team planned to contact the affected app owners. Be wary of messages that quote your orders or tickets, and ask the app’s operator if you gave it identity documents.

Do I have to report it if my app’s data was open?

Possibly. Lovable’s terms make you responsible for the apps you publish and their data, and if the GDPR applies to your app, a breach that risks people’s rights generally has to be reported to the data protection authority within 72 hours of learning of it. Lock the tables first, then ask a lawyer about your case.

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